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Abstract 
Communication is a process aimed at agreement on some situation 
definition. When the agreement is not immediate, a discussion is needed to 
resolve the points of disagreement using argumentation. Although such a 
discussion is recognized in the LAP approaches, no formal treatment of it 
has been given so far. In this paper, we introduce a formal model based on 
recent results from argumentation theory. It suggests some valuable norms 
and procedures for rational discussion that could be applied in business 
process support, IS design as well as in communication diagnosis. The 
model is further developed in confrontation with the well-known IBIS 
approach of Conklin. This results in a so-called 3-box model that is proposed 
as an extension of the Transaction Process Model of Van  Reijswoud. 
1 Introduction 
In the Language/Action Perspective, as well as in other areas, such as agent 
communication languages, the semantics of conversations is usually described in 
terms of speech acts (as in the Conversation for Action protocol of Winograd & 
Flores, 1986) and the effects of these in terms of beliefs, intentions and obligations 
(e.g. Weigand et al, 1995; Chaib-Draa & Dignum, 2002). We want to extend this 
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framework in several ways. First, we want to account better for the interplay of 
communicative action and common ground (cf. Clark, 1996; Weigand et al, 2003). 
The semantics of communicative actions is given in terms of claims, and these 
claims get their support from the shared background in the community. The effects 
of the communicative actions appeal to the common ground as well: once a claim 
is conceded, its content becomes mutually accepted. 
The second extension is to account for the possibility of a rational discussion by 
linking to argumentation theory. A discussion layer is recognized in LAP 
(Reijswoud, 1996), but has not been formally worked out there yet. Argumentation 
can be viewed the process of building a bridge between what is agreed upon in the 
community (or relationship) in the form of common ground (shared norms, in the 























Fig. 1. Transaction Process Model (Reijswoud, 1996). The CA’s are 
communicative actions. For example, CA1 is a request, and CA2 the acceptance of 
the request. The alternative to CA2 is CA5 (request justification), by means of 
which the Hearer moves into the Discussion and Failure layer.  
The intended contribution of this paper is primarily theoretical: development of 
a formal communication model based on the Language/Action Perspective and 
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encompassing argumentation. This is done by the incremental development of a 
model in confrontation with existing formal models and methods grounded in 
practice. Although the primary result is theoretical, we believe that this model can 
be a useful reference for designers of  all kinds of communication systems, such as 
Negotiation Support Systems, Workflow systems, and Group Support Systems.The 
structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we briefly recall related work in 
the field of LAP, in particular, the Transaction Process Model (TPM) of Van 
Reijswoud. In section 3, an argumentation semantics for communicative action is 
introduced in which validity claims are central. This framework can be easily 
extended to include discussions on the claims (section 4). In section 5, the 
framework is applied to and confronted with the existing discussion tool Questmap 
which is grounded in the Issue-Based Information Systems (IBIS) paradigm. On 
the one hand, we are interested in the question whether IBIS can profit from a 
formal underpinning by the argumentation framework, but on the other hand, we 
are also interested in the completeness and appropriateness of the argumentation 
framework when confronted with a class of systems that have a long history of 
practical experience. This results in section 6 with a proposal on the status and 
structure of the discussion layer: the 3-box model. We conclude with a summary 
of results and some directions for future research. 
2 Related work 
One of the first references in the LAP literature to argumentation is made in 
(Chang & Woo, 1994). This article describes a speech-act based negotiation 
protocol (SANP). Its design is based on Ballmer and Brennenstuhl’s work on the 
classification of speech act verbs in German. This study revealed that many speech 
act verbs belong to the semantic center “Verbal Struggle” (for example, admit, 
defeat, give in, press, defend, retreat, claim). The article also draws on the classical 
argument model of Toulmin (Toulmin, 1969).  One of the observations of the 
study was that the Struggle Model was more effective in situations where the 
participants had strong opinions beforehand, and less effective in more exploratory 
discussions.  
The introduction already briefly mentioned the TPM model of Van Reijswoud 
(fig. 1). In contrast to the Conversation for Action as introduced by Winograd & 
Flores (1986), the TPM makes a clear separation between three communication 
layers: the success layer, the discussion and failure layer and the discourse layer. 
Whereas the former was based primarily on Searle’s speech act theory, the latter is 
based on Habermas’ theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984). For 
Habermas, communicative action is oriented towards agreement. To arrive at 
agreement, participants make statements containing validity claims. Agreement is 
reached when the participants agree on the validity claims. When they do not 
agree, they are supposed to enter a rational discussion to resolve the issue. 
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Presumably, there are certain background norms and rules that enable this 
resolution. Sometimes, this background has to be revitalized or adapted; this is 
what the discourse layer is supposed to do. 
In the Conversation for Action, the Hearer is allowed to counter a request, 
which again may be countered by the other party, until one of the two does not 
counter anymore (accepts, or cancels the conversation). If we look at the 
discussion layer of TPM, we find that the hearer/executor can “counter” by 
requesting justification of a claim. Apparently, he never makes counterclaims. The 
cycle of request justification/provide justification (CA5/CA6) stops when the 
Hearer/Executor accepts the claim (CA2) or the conversation is cancelled 
(CA8,CA9,CA10). The model also allows the Initiator to redefine his claim (CA7), 
or any party to enter the Discourse layer (CA18, CA19). One of the goals of this 
paper is to be more precise on the discussion cycle, as it seems to have not much 
semantic structure. This structure can help the parties in seeing more clearly what 
the disagreement is about, in avoiding “livelock” situations where arguments are 
exchanged without any progress, and thereby also in resolving the discussion more 
effectively and timely.  
The model of Toulmin (in combination with Rhetorical Structure Theory) has 
also been used in (Dalianis & Johannesson, 1998) in the area of Requirements 
Engineering. A clear argument structure can help in generating explanations (for 
the purpose of validating the design against the user requirements). The focus in 
their paper is on the conceptual structure of arguments (claim, warrant, ground 
etc), however, it does not consider the logical aspects. 
3 Argumentation semantics of communicative action – the 
basic model 
Both the Conversation for Action protocol and the Transaction Process Model 
characterize conversations by means of a state diagram. The conversational state is 
characterized by which conversational acts are possible from there and whose turn 
it is. Unfortunately, this says very little about the illocutionary effect of the 
conversational act (what the speech act does). In (Weigand et al, 1995), a formal 
language called Lill was described with which an integrated semantics for 
information and communication  systems can be expressed. It is an extension of 
dynamic deontic logic and the semantics of speech acts is described using 
preconditions and postconditions. For example, the postcondition of an authorized 
request is that the Hearer is obliged to perform the requested action. Pre- and 
postconditions have been used also in agent communication languages such as 
KQML and FIPA-ACL (see Chaibdraa & Dignum, 2002 for references). For 
example, the precondition of KQML's tell message states that the sender believes 
what he tells and that he knows that the receiver wants to know that the sender 
believes it. The postcondition of sending the tell message is that the receiver can 
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conclude that the sender believes the content of the message. In a similar vein, 
FIPA-ACL uses feasibility preconditions and rational effects. 
There have been many discussions about this approach (Chaibdraa & Dignum, 
2002).  One problem in many of these proposals is that the semantics refer to 
mental states such as beliefs, and it is not very clear what it means that an agent, 
being a kind of software, holds a certain belief. Another problem is that FIPA-
ACL does specify the effects in the mental state of the sender, but offers no clue 
on how to infer the mental states of the receiver. For a semantics of 
communication, this is rather disappointing. With regards to the first problem, 
some have argued that the semantics should not be based on mental states, but on 
social commitments (Singh, 2000). Others have tried to ground the semantics in 
the notion of sign conventions (Jones & Parent, 2003). The latter approach takes 
its starting point in Searle’s dictum that if the performance by agent j of a given 
linguistic act counts as an assertion of the truth of A, j’s performance counts as an 
undertaking to the effect that A is true. In other words, given the right functioning 
of the sign conventions within a community, A “ought to be” true when j asserts 
A. This leads then to the introduction of a modality “ought to be (according to the 
conventions)” for a first approximation of the meaning of a speech act, from which 
beliefs, obligations etc are derived in a second step, according to additional norms. 
In the following we will take an approach that has a similar formal structure, but 
we instead of “ought to be”, we will use the modality “(ought to be) agreed”: when 
j asserts A and I concurs, then this counts as agreement. 
3.1 Communication by agreement 
The semantics that we propose in this paper is based on Habermas' theory of 
communicative action. This theory is based on the notion of validity claim. 
Speakers make claims, and when these claims are conceded, they turn into 
common ground. In this way, coordination is enabled. The general scheme is as 
follows. 
Definition 
For all φ being a well-formed formula, I and J being communicative actors: 
 
[claim(I,φ); accept(J,φ)] agreed({I,J},φ) 
 
In words: when φ has been claimed by I and has been accepted by J, it is agreed 
upon by I and J. In a more refined account, a difference could be made between 
claiming and suggesting. Both are actions oriented towards agreement. However, 
in the case of a claim, the Speaker is willing to back up (provide justification), 
whereas in the case of a suggestion, the speaker only expresses that he is willing to 
accept the claim if the other party supports it too. 
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Although in our opinion this “communication by agreement” scheme is highly 
generic, one could ask the question whether this holds in all settings. In particular, 
what about communicative acts based on power? One viable approach is to accept 
the scheme as such, but to recognize that there are different contexts and different 
systems of norms that justify claims. For example, power (institutional, political, 
or otherwise) can be a legitimate justification for a directive in one case and not in 
another. We also recognize that in situations where the norms and authorizations 
are formalized (almost) completely, not much room is left for discussion, and so 
the acceptance as a separate act becomes (again, almost) redundant. That is why 
the acceptance is often left implicit for economic reasons, although this needs to be 
done with care (cf. Weigand & De Moor, 2003). 
The meta-predicates claim, accept, and agreed adhere to some minimal logical 
properties, such as conjunction distribution, 
 
agreed(X,φ ∧ ψ ) ⇔  agreed (X,φ)  ∧  agreed(X,ψ) 
 
but they are not necessarily deductively closed, for instance, as this would ignore 
the bounded rationality of the actors. 
The fact that φ has the status "agreed" does not say anything about its truth. In 
that respect, this modality is comparable to the “ought to be” modality of Jones 
and Parent. Depending on whether the hearer is convinced of the sincerity and 
trustworthiness of the speaker, she will infer from here (or not) that φ is believed 
by the speaker and whether φ is true. We distinguish three different ways of 
relating the common ground and truth: 
1. Axioms are added to the effect that everything that is in the common 
ground is considered true and believed by all parties. This approach is a 
bit naive, but can work in certain situations. 
2. Refraining from inferring truth or belief, we restrict ourselves to the 
"agreed". What usually counts for coordination purposes is what is 
agreed upon, so why bother about beliefs and truth? 
3. To believe or not to believe is left to the actor. That is, "believe" is 
introduced as an action that turns a statement from the common ground 
into the belief set of the actor.  Similarly, what counts as „true“ is made 
dependent on certain certain procedures within the community. 
Alternative (3) is the most general, but we posit that in the organizational practice, 
(2) is usually sufficient. 
Claims and acceptances can refer to things already agreed upon, or to things 
that are to be agreed upon. The first category contains what is traditionally called 
the stock of presuppositions. For example, if a speaker claims that an obligation 
has been fulfilled, the presupposition is that there was an obligation. For the 
hearer, the following situations can be distinguished: 
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1. The hearer is already committed to the claim (the presupposition was 
justified), and so has no problem in accepting it. 
2. The hearer is not committed to the claim (the presupposition was not 
justified), but is willing to assume it had already been agreed upon. 
3. The hearer is not commited to the claim, and does not want to commit 
either,  typically because it conflicts with some of her commitments. 
3.2 The objects of agreement 
Among the many kinds of claims that are made by a speaker when performing a 
conversational act, we distinguish the following essential categories for the success 
layer of the Conversation for Action.  
 
1. claims about the „agreed“ – such as presuppositions. The object of the 
claim can be manykind including the categories given below.  To 
distinguish these claims from the new claims, we use the modality agreed 
2. claims about conversation roles – the conversation roles that we 
distinguish are Initiator, Executor and Evaluator. 
3. authorization claims - when performing a conversational act, the speaker 
claims that he is authorized to perform the act.  Authorization claims 
should be distinguished from authorizing speech acts where some agent 
transfers an authorization (with the claim that the agent himself is 
authorized to authorize). 
4. claims about actions  - the things to be achieved.  Actions can be in one of 
the following states: {desired, intended, started, finished, approved, 
dismissed}. These phases correspond roughly to the well-known action 
cycle of Norman (Norman, 1990). The difference between intended and 
desired is whether the action has been planned already or not yet. 
5. claims about actor obligations - what an actor or set of actors should do.  
Obligations can be in one of the following states: {created, cancelled, 
violated, fulfilled}.  
 
This categorization is not meant to be exhaustive, but it covers the most important 
cases in our context. For each of the claim types there is also a corresponding 
accept action. There is a certain hierarchy of the claims, in the sense that the 
authorizations and roles usually have to be established first before the Hearer will 
be eager to accept the content, and the status of the obligation depends on the 
action status. The presuppositions (what is claimed to be agreed already), precede 
all the other claims. 
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Example 
The conversation act that starts the conversation (CA1) is the request of an 
action by the Initiator  to the Executor. Let us indicate the action by s. When 
user u initiates CA1 towards Hearer h, he makes the following claims: 
 
1) agreed(desired(s)) - the request presupposes that the action was 
already agreed to be desired 
2) Initiator(u), Executor(h) 
3) authorized(u,CA1)- the speaker, u, is permitted to perform this request 
4) intended(s) - the action state of the action s is "intended" ("to be 
done"). The aim of the communicative action is that the action is not 
only desired, but becomes planned. 
5) created(obligation(h,s)) - the Hearer (role) is obliged to perform the 
action 
 
A request of an action is done after a breakdown has been observed or an 
opportunity has been recognized. At this point, the desirability of the action has 
been discussed already, so the Conversation for Action starts when s already has 
the status "desired". The Speaker (with the initiator role) claims that the action is 
to be performed now (intended), and claims/suggests that the Hearer (with 
Executor role) is obliged to perform it. Both claims can be challenged by the 
Hearer, but if they are accepted, they lead to an obligation for the Executor and a 
state change of the action itself. The obligation claims and action claims are 
closely related, because it would be odd when an action is considered as 
“intended“, but no one is responsible for the execution, or vice versa. However, 
these odd situations can happen in complex settings. For example, when an 
Executor withdraws and his obligation is cancelled. Or when the request above 
(CA1) is made in a situation where no actor is Executor and the request is not 
directed at one single person (e.g. in a mailing list, or in a meeting), so that the 
claim "created(obligation(H,kd))" is void. By separating the two claims, we can 
also accommodate the situation that the Hearer accepts one claim but challenges 
the other, thus preparing the ground for a more focused discussion. 
CA1, by attempting to create an obligation on the part of the Hearer, is a typical 
request. Whether it is a legitimate request, can only be determined against the 
background of the norms (De Moor & Jeusfeld, 2001), and it is also this normative 
background that determines the net effect.  
Example (continued) 
The intended response of CA1 is CA2. This action is performed by the 
Hearer  (a turn taking takes place) assuming the Executor role and consists 
of a commitment to the action. The authorization claim of CA2 is: 
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authorized(h,CA2) - the Hearer is authorized to make a 
commitment.  
 
Furthermore, this conversational act contains acceptances corresponding to 
the claims (suggestions) made in CA1 above. So CA1 and CA2 together 
have at least the effect that "created (obligation(h,s))" and "intended(s)" are 
"agreed".  
 
If everything goes well, the obligation will move later to the status 
"fulfilled” and s will move to the status "executing" and then "finished" 
and "approved". If is does not go well, the obligation will move to the 
status "cancelled" or "violated" and the status of the action to “dismissed”. 
 
The intended response CA2 is not the only possible one. If the Hearer does not 
accept the claims, she can challenge them. The discussion needed to resolve this 
disagreement is worked out in the next section. The result can be that the Hearer 
does accept the claims, or that the Speaker modifies his claims, or a break-down of 
the conversation. 
4 Extending the basic model to cover argumentation semantics 
of discussions 
A conversation state is characterized by the various types of claims and whether 
they are accepted or not. A further refinement of this characterization is needed 
when we want to account for challenging validity claims, that is, for the possibility 
of the actors to enter the Discussion and Failure Layer. This discussion can be 
modelled as rational discourse based on argumentation. 
In recent years, dialogue systems for argumentation have received interest in 
several fields of AI, particularly in AI and law (Prakken, 2000; Prakken, 2001) and 
agent communication languages (Amgoud, 2002; Bentahar et al, 2003). In 
argumentation theory, formal dialogue systems have been developed for so-called 
"persuasion" or "critical discussion (Mackenzie, 1979; Walton & Krabbe, 1995 – 
other types are information-seeking dialogues and inquiry dialogues). The 
dialogue system in this case regulates the use of speech acts for such things as 
making or challenging a claim, accepting, withdrawing or arguing. The proponent 
of a claim aims at making the opponent concede (accept) his claim; the opponent 
instead aims at making the proponent withdraw his claim. Such a dialogue ends 
when one of the players has fulfilled his aim.  
Prakken defines a dialogue system (in particular, a protocol for persuasion by 
dispute, PPD for short) as a tuple consisting of many elements. We have slightly 
adapted and simplified his system in the following definition. Our reformulation 
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reflects the fact that in our view, communicative action is focused on resolving 
conflicts rather than winning arguments. 
Definition 
A protocol for persuasion by dispute (PPD) consists of the following elements 
Players, Acts, Replies, Moves, Comms, Rules, Resolution as defined below 
 
Players, typically represented with the characters S and H 
 
Acts, the set of discussion acts: claim(φ), argue(φ, so ψ), 
why(φ), retract(φ), accept(φ), where φ is a wff and ”ψ, so 
φ”  is an argument. Note that the claim and accept have been defined 
already in the above – which indicates the discussion layer is quite a 
natural elaboration of the success layer of communication if the latter is 
modelled in a Habermasian way on the basis of validity claims.  
 
Replies, a function that defines for each act what are the possible reply acts 









claim φ why φ 
argue Φ so ¬φ 
accept φ 
why φ argue Φ so φ retract φ 
accept φ   
retract φ   
argue A: Φ so ψ 
  where A identifies this 
     argument 
argue B: φ’ so ψ’  
 where argument B challenges or 
   undercuts A 
why φI  
   where φI ∈ Φ 
accept A 
retract C 
  where C is an argument 
      challenged by A 
accept φi 
Table 1: Argumentation acts and replies  (based on Prakken, 2001).  
 
Moves, the set of all well-formed moves. An initial move is a pair <Player, 
Act>, a responding move is a triple <Player, Act, Move>, where the third 
component indicates the move to which the current move responds. 
 
Comms is a function that assigns to each player at each stage of a dialogue 
a set of propositions to which the player is committed at that stage. At the 
start, these can be considered empty or equal to the Agreed. 
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Rules is a function that for any dialogue state specifies the allowed moves 
at that point, given the dialogue so far and the players' commitments. 
 
Resolution, is a function that determines how the discussion result is 
established. One way of establishing the result is to determine who is the 
“winner”, that is subsequently defined as the one whose argument cannot 
be defeated. In a multi-actor setting, a voting procedure could be used. 
 
For example, consider CA5 (request justification of validity claim) and CA6 
(provide justification of validity claim). These acts do not have an immediate 
effect on the Agreed. However, what does change is the dialogical status of a 
claim. CA5 corresponds to a why(φ) move, where φ is one of the validity claims  
made by the Initiator, and CA6 corresponds to an argue(ψ, so φ) move that 
tries to defend the original validity claim.1 
The dialogical status of the move indicates its status in the discussion.  A 
certain claim is "in" when it has been made and not challenged. If it has been 
challenged, it becomes "out", until the challenge itself is effectively replied to. 
Formally: 
Dialogical status of moves 
A move M of a dialogue D is either in or out in D. It is in in D iff 
1. M is accepted in D, or else: 
2. all attacking moves in D that reply to it are out in D 
 
This notion makes it possible to determine, at each stage of the discussion, 
which moves are in and out. In particular, it can be determined what is the status of 
the validity claim that started the discussion. Note that when the claim is accepted 
immediately (success layer), the move is immediately in, and no discussion is 
necessary (or, to be more precise, no discussion is relevant as it would not change 
the dialogical status of the claim anymore). 
The dialogical status of the moves is one element of the logical characterization 
of a state. The other important element is Comms, the commitments of the 
discussion partners at that state. These commitments are to be understood here in 
the context of the rational discussion; they represent what the player adheres to, 
even if it is only for the sake of the argument (they do not correspond with 
responsibilities for action). During a discussion, the partners can take on different 
                                                 
1 Note that we do not say that during the argumentation process, the Agreed is never affected. On 
the contrary, in a thriving community, continuous refinement of common beliefs should take place. 
So claims and acceptances on sub-items, as well as retracts, should be allowed. 
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commitment, of which only a part is agreed. (so the commitments are always a 
superset of  the Agreed). 
The logical semantics of the possible discussion acts can be represented using 
Comms. For example, the effect of argue(φ, so ψ) is that  φ  and ψ are added 
to the commitments of the speaker. The preconditions of the discussion acts refer 
to the Commitments as well. One general condition is that Comms must be left 
consistent. More specific preconditions are given in the following table based on 







Postcondition (effects on the 
speakers commitments) 
Claim φ Comms ∪ {φ}is consistent Comms := Comms ∪ {φ} 
Argue Φ so ψ  Comms := Comms ∪ {ψ}∪ Φ 
retract φ φ ∈ Comms (explicitly added) Comms := Comms / {φ} 
accept φ φ ∉ Comms  
Comms do not justify ¬φ 
Comms := Comms ∪ {φ} 
why φ Comms do not justify φ (no change) 
Table 2: Pre- and postcondition rules. Note that the moves can only affect the 
commitments of the speaker of the act. 
 
Each dialogue system specifies somehow what are the allowed moves at some 
point (the Rules component). Obviously, this function depends on many factors. In 
dialogue theory, the following norms have been proposed for inclusion in the rules 
of any rational discussion: 
Non-repetition  
If moves mi and mj are both reply to M, then their content should be 
different. 
Relevance 
A move is relevant iff it replies to a relevant target. A target is relevant iff 
any attacking reply to it changes the dialogical status of the initial move. 
Every move (except the initial move) should be relevant. 
No self-contradiction 
It is not allowed to concede to a proposition if the opposite is justified by 
the player's own commitments (it is allowed that the speaker has changed 
his mind, but then he should retract his earlier commitment). 
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These norms are useful for increasing the coherence of conversations. If we would 
only have the Process Model any repetition of CA5 and CA6 (request justification, 
provide justification) would be allowed, and this cycle could go on endlessly. By 
imposing the right dialogue system rules, we can exclude certain incoherent 
conversations and keep the meaningful conversations only. Another nice property 
of dialogue rules is that they can guarantee (under certain circumstances) that 
when φ is deducible from the shared background with classical inference, there is 
also a strategy for justifying φ in the argumentation game. In addition, it is 
possible to go beyond classical inference, for example, by adding rules to the PPD 
on the assignment of the "burden of proof". Or by allowing the participants to 
bring in new facts during the discussion. The discussion layer of communicative 
action naturally extends into the Discourse Layer in which new rules, meanings 
and facts can be discussed and added to the shared commitments. This discourse 
layer is important for two reasons: first, most situations are open-ended and 
dynamic and so the background knowledge is never fixed and finished. Therefore, 
going into discourse should always be possible. It is desirable to structure the 
discourse, and record its results; in this way, organizations (or communities) can 
learn. 
5 Argumentation in IBIS 
The Issue-Based Information System (IBIS) paradigm originated in the 70’s to 
deal with the discussions on wicked problems (Kurz & Rittel,  1970). Wicked 
problems cannot be solved in traditional ways, as no perfect solution can be found. 
The understanding of the problem evolves as the solution is being worked on, but 
no clear agreement on what the “real problem” is can be found. IBIS is an 
environment of multiple parties facing different views about the problem, different 
values and beliefs, few hard data, and time pressure for resolution. The method 
supports dialogue among the stakeholders in the problem. Applications grounded 
in IBIS were developed in the ‘80s (and onwards) by Jeff Conklin and others 
(Conklin and Begemann, 1988). To reach convergence, Conklin et al (2003) 
propose to use a human facilitator. However, we argue that our argumentation 
semantics can also help to formalize the reaching of convergence, in order to have 
at least part of this improved IBIS process supported by automated systems.   
The key elements of IBIS are: issues (questions), positions (ideas), and 
arguments. Translated into the argumentation framework that we presented in this 
paper, the issues are close to why-moves, the positions are claim-moves, and the 
arguments are argue-moves. The why-move puts a certain proposition into 
question. In the Conversation for Action, the why-move is usually preceded by a 
validity claim (a claim-move by some actor in some action context). It seems that 
IBIS does not take this context into account. This may be a pity, as the problem 
context can have a steering function on what otherwise could become an academic 
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exercise of dreaming up possible questions and positions. On the other hand, we 
should mention that the IBIS question is typically more than a why-move. The 
question can be a yes/no-question (then it is a why-move), but it can also be (and 
according to IBIS, preferably is) an open question. The open question is not 
included in the dialogue system above. We could say that it is a move that 
introduces an issue and whose possible replies are various claims about the issue. 
In IBIS, these claims (the positions) are not necessarily mutually exclusive, so it is 
not needed to justify one position against another: each one is evaluated on its own 
merits. The only rule is that the claim must be about the issue. It has been said that 
the power of IBIS is that it moves the asking of questions into a central role in the 
dialogue process. The open question invites the participants to consider possible 
alternatives, instead of locking them up in one solution direction.  
Besides the focus on (open) questions, another alleged advantage of IBIS is the 
separation of positions and arguments. Participants are often tempted to pack them 
into one statement. By separating them, IBIS permits a more structured discussion, 
as it now becomes possible to either attack (or support) the argument, or attack (or 
support) the position. This feature of IBIS could improve the argumentation 
framework given above. It suggests that the argue Φ so ψ move is a complex 
one that is better split up in a set of connected moves: claim Φ,  claim φI  (for 
all components of  Φ), and argue Φ so ψ (or so ¬ψ, in the case of a con 
argument). The complexity of the argue move can be seen already in Table1 and 2, 
as it is the only move that has multiple agreeing and disagreeing replies. 
A complete formalization of IBIS in terms of the argumentation model (or some 
extension) is beyond the scope of this paper. We restrict ourselves to evaluating 
how IBIS copes with the three general rules for discussions: 
 
The non-repetition rule 
As arguments and positions are added to one map, repeating arguments is 
excluded. It is mentioned as a big practical advantage that the trick of  “truth by 
repetition” is automatically disarmed in IBIS systems. This helps considerably in 
raising the quality of dialogues. 
 
The relevance rule 
The positions can be seen as claim-moves, and the arguments as argue-moves. The 
arguments can be supporting or objecting. The former ones argue for the position, 
and the latter against the position. IBIS does not have a relevance rule such as we 
defined above, but this could be added. This could avoid useless discussions on 
sub-issues whose resolution would not affect the main issue anyway (an example 
is adding yet another argument against a claim, when there is already an argument 
con that has been accepted). We suggest therefore that IBIS gives the possibility of 
keeping track of the dialogical status of positions and arguments.  
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The “no self-contradiction” rule 
An ingredient of the argumentation model that seems to be missing in IBIS is the 
set of Commitments. When a discussion extends in time, the map may have 
become quite complex and may contain ideas and arguments from different 
participants. Then it may be unclear who is or was committed to what. A possible 
advantage is that the argumentation may be more of a collaborative exercise. Actor 
A may bring in a position, while B may bring in a supporting argument for it. The 
other side of this coin is that actors may get too much freedom, up to a level where 
their position (their proposal) becomes incoherent. Then the discussion may 
become senseless. This problem is not easily solved, as the positions and 
arguments are not given in a formal language and typically resist logical 
interpretation. However, IBIS does have a Decision Node type, which is used to 
capture the resolution of a question into a decision. In this way, some parts of the 
map can be fixed – they correspond to what is agreed upon (and therefore 
committed).  
6 The 3-box model of communicative action 
In the above, we have introduced an argumentation framework that allows for an 
Habermasian semantics of communicative action. The framework is based on 
existing logical theories and has been confronted with the more practical and 
empirically validated IBIS method. On the basis of that, we propose a modification 
of the TPM model tentatively called the 3-box model of communicative action 
(see fig. 2). The picture is to be read as follows: we distinguish three boxes that 
exist side by side, and that can be updated independently. So in contrast to TPM, 
that has a discussion part related to the initiating phase of the transaction (state 
6,7,8) and a part related to the evaluating phase (state 9,10,8), we have only one 
discourse box that can be entered at any time. In the process box (corresponding to 
the success layer), claims and accepts can be made (to indicate the pending status 
of claims, we use dotted boxes for these conversation states). The common ground 
box is not modeled as a state transition diagram (as in Conversation for Action and 
TPM), but, just as in IBIS, as a diagram that represents the growing argumentation 
structure. The most important actions here are adding claims, and adding 
arguments pro or con. Note that the link between a claim and the argument is a 
spawned tree, as there may be several claims φI that together form the basis of the 
argument. Furthermore, it is possible to accept a claim (then we get an undotted 
box), and also to retract a claim (marked by a cross). When the Hearer challenges a 
claim in the success layer (the CA5 in TPM), this has the effect of putting that 
claim into the discussion box and establishing a link between the boxes. We also 
allow for IBIS questions in the discussion box (marked here by a circle). In 
explorative discussions, it is be better to broaden a challenge (typically a closed 
question) to an open question. 
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In the process box, in fact, any business process modeling formalism can be 
used, including for example, Petri Nets. The 3-box model only specifies that it 
should be possible to jump out of the process box when some claim is challenged.  









discussion box           

















Fig. 2: The 3-box model of communicative action 
The common ground box (corresponding to the discourse layer) is again 
independent from process box and discussion box. It is also a growing structure, 
which consists of facts, definitions, and rules (proposed, proposed and accepted, or 
retracted). In line with Stamper (2000), we group all these knowledge items 
together under the term „norm“.  In practice, there may be several of these boxes. 
Important here is the possibility of drawing priority links between the norms, 
which implies an overrule relationship. In practice, a norm system is seldom 
completely free of conflicts. Therefore an important goal of discourse is to solve 
norm conflicts by deciding on the relative weight. From the discussion box, it is 
+ - 





-     add question 
- add claim (to question) 
- challenge claim 
- add argument to claim (+/-)
- retract claim 
- accept claim 
- link claim to discourse 
actions: 
- add norm 
- prioritize 
- retract norm 
- accept norm 
- discuss norm 
….
actions: 
- add claim 
- retract claim 
- redefine claim 
- accept claim  
- discuss claim 
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possible to link to the common ground box if the claim is directly warranted by a 
background norm. Conversely, it is also possible to go from the common ground 
box to the discussion box if a background norm is challenged (a community may 
have procedural rules that say when such a meta-discussion is allowed and how). 
 
Example 
A customer orders a product for a certain price. The seller does not accept the 
claim that the price is such and such, and starts a discussion. In the discussion, 
the customer grounds his argument on the rule that when a price is published 
somewhere, the seller is bound to it.  In addition, he claims that this price has 
been published on the web page. The seller does not challenge the rule as such, 
but claims that it was explicitly stated on the bottom of the page that the prices 
are subject to changes and not guaranteed. In other words, he claims that the 
rule used by the customer is overruled by the rule that when the seller makes an 
explicit caveat, the price is not guaranteed. To convince the customer, the 
customer has to accept this norm, plus the claim that this caveat was made, and 
that this norm has priority over the other norm. Then the customer cannot 
defend his claim anymore, and may revise his order accordingly. 
 
In the description so far, we have assumed one Speaker and one Hearer. 
However, the model can be easily extended to a multiparty situation. What needs 
to be specified then, in addition, is how a claim is accepted (e.g. a voting 
procedure). The participants per box may differ: the workflow can have just two 
participants, but when a discussion is started, more people can be involved, or 
even completely different people (e.g. management instead of operational people). 
The 3-box model is to be viewed as a „deep structure“ of communicative action, 
not as the design of an operational system like Questmap. Communicative action is 
highly situated, and settings differ not only in the common ground boxes, but also 
in the rules governing the possible actions, and the media and tools put to use. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced an argumation framework that describes the 
semantics of communicative action, both at the success layer and at the discussion 
layer, in a unified way. The framework is based on logical Argumentation Theory. 
We have shown how conversational acts from the Transaction Process Model can 
be represented in this framework. The framework also extends the TPM by 
offering a more complete set of discussion acts, as well as rules and norms that can 
structure the discussion. We have confronted the logical framework with a system 
with a long history of practical experience, IBIS. This confontation resulted in 
some recommendations for IBIS, but also to some modifications in our framework. 
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Finally, we have come up with a reformulation of the 3-layered Transaction 
Process Model in the form of a 3-box model of communicative action. Evidently, 
this reformulation is still tentative and needs to be worked out in more detail. 
Validation is to be achieved by showing with examples or analytically, that any 
coherent conversation can be represented with this model. 
Although this article has been written with the Conversation for Action in mind, 
the extended semantics described is in fact quite general, and we contend that it 
can be used in other contexts as well, for example, in the area of web-services and 
in agent societies. An important application domain is also Negotiation Support 
and Dispute Resolution. Negotiation is a complicated conversation type that 
typically includes discussions. The Negoist system described in (Schoop et al, 
2003) supports the monitoring of obligations. It also allows for discussions in the 
form of offers and counter-offers. However,  it might be useful to separate the 
claim (position) from its arguments, so that the arguments can be discussed 
separately. This is even more so the case when we generalize from the order 
negotiation process to business negotiation in general. Dispute resolution would 
not work on offers and counter-offers only. What is important there is to develop 
the right arguments given the common background (contract and relevant law). 
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